雙語閱讀｜英國脫歐談判無法實現“快刀斬亂麻”
Nine tumultuous months after Britons voted to leave the European Union, the real Brexit process is at last under way. Theresa May’s dispatch of a letter to the European Council on March 29th, invoking Article 50 of the EU treaty, marked the point at which Britain’s withdrawal from the union became all but inevitable. For half the country’s population this was a moment to celebrate; for the other half, including this newspaper, it marked a bleak day. The future of both camps—and of the EU itself—now depends on what Mrs May does next.
在全民公投決定脫離歐盟之後的九個月裡，英國國內局勢動盪不已，
The negotiations are sure to be difficult. Time is short, since Article 50 comes with a two-year deadline. The task of unwinding Britain’s membership of the club is fearsomely complex. Neither side is well prepared. In Britain, where Brexit increasingly resembles a faith-based initiative, voters have been given wildly unrealistic expectations of the Utopia ahead. Their first contact with the reality of losing preferential access to their main market will be traumatic. Unless Mrs May can persuade the Brexiteers on her own side that they must accept concessions, Britain may end up flouncing out of Europe without any deal at all.
可以肯定的是，脫歐談判會進行地十分艱難。
Cruising for a bruising
自尋麻煩
The timetable is tighter even than it looks. The sides may spend weeks arguing over process. The EU wants to fix the terms of the Article 50 divorce, covering such matters as the rights of citizens resident in other countries and Britain’s multi-billion-euro exit bill, before starting work on a future trade deal; Mrs May wants to negotiate on everything at once. Nothing much will be agreed on before the German election in September. At the end of it all, ratifying the deal will take six months. That leaves little more than a year for the talks themselves.
談判日程會比表面看上去還要緊迫。首先，雙方爭論流程就可能耗時數周。歐盟希望在著手談判新的貿易協定前先敲定脫歐的談判條件，包括確保彼此居住在對方境內公民的權利以及支付數百億的脫歐費用；特雷莎·梅則希望立即開始所有事項的談判。可是，
Mrs May’s priority is to fulfil the Leave campaign’s promise to “take back control” by ending the free movement of EU citizens to Britain and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). She has acknowledged that this means leaving the EU’s single market. But leaving would be a mistake. Even if it takes control of immigration, Britain will not be able to cut the numbers much without damaging the economy, as ministers are slowly realizing. And the government is wrong to claim that there exists some relationship with the single market that has all the benefits of membership with none of the costs.
特雷莎·梅的首要任務是叫停歐盟公民自由出入英國以及脫離歐洲法院的司法管轄，以此來兌現脫歐宣傳時承諾的“奪回控制權”。她承認此舉意味著放棄歐盟單一市場准入。但是，放棄歐盟市場將鑄成大錯。英國政府會慢慢意識到，
It is true that many Britons backed Brexit because they wanted to cut immigration and regain sovereignty, but they did not vote to make themselves poorer—as Mrs May’s “hard Brexit” will. Her government has been characterized by u- turns and her letter this week was more emollient than some of her earlier statements. Even so, in thrall to Brexiteering backbenchers and the Eurosceptic press, she is unlikely to change course now.
的確，很多英國民眾支持脫歐就是希望政府能削減移民數量，重掌國家主權，但是，沒人希望以犧牲經濟為代價——就像特雷莎·梅的“硬脫歐”政策會帶來的後果那樣。不過，
Mrs May is not just making the wrong choices, but also downplaying awkward trade-offs. By promising barrier-free access to the single market while stopping EU migrants and ending the ECJ’s jurisdiction, she is still telling Britons they can have their cake and eat it. Although she concedes that exporters to the EU will have to obey EU rules, the more Mrs May insists on controlling EU migration and escaping the ECJ, the less barrier-free will be Britain’s overall access to the single market. This is not just because free movement of people is a condition for the EU, nor because it will be hard to secure tariff-free access for trade in goods, something both sides can readily agree on. It is because the biggest obstacles swept away by the single market are not tariffs or customs checks, but non-tariff barriers such as standards, regulations and state-aid rules. Unless Britain accepts these, which implies a role for the system’s referee, the ECJ, it cannot operate freely in the single market—as even American firms trading in the EU have found.
然而，特雷莎·梅不只是錯誤地選擇了脫歐，英國在談判中處於劣勢這點，她也在極力掩飾。她一方面向公眾承諾英國可以毫無障礙地自由出入歐盟單一市場，另一方面又禁止歐盟移民自由流入、反對歐洲法院的司法管轄，通過這些手段，她告知英國民眾仍然能享受原先的權利。雖然特雷莎·梅承認，對歐盟出口的英國企業未來可能要遵守歐盟法律法規，她越是堅持要管控歐盟移民數量、擺脫歐洲法院管轄，英國在歐盟市場的全面准入障礙就越大。這不僅是因為歐盟開出的條件之一就是確保人員自由流動，也不僅是因為難以確保零關稅商品交易准入——這些問題雙方其實很快就能協商一致。真正原因在於，單一市場為自由貿易清除的最大障礙既非關稅也非海關檢查，而是各類標準、法規和國家支持的法律法規。除非英國全盤接受，而這離不開歐盟體系的裁判，即歐洲法院，否則英國無法享受單一市場的自由貿易，甚至不如那些與歐盟貿易的美國企業。
Boxed into a corner
陷入絕境
The most dangerous of Mrs May’s illusions has been her claim that no deal is better than a bad deal. Her letter this week steps back from this notion, but only a pace. To revert to trading with the EU only on World Trade Organization (WTO) terms would cause serious harm to Britain’s economy. It would mean the EU imposing tariffs plus a full panoply of non-tariff barriers on almost half Britain’s exports. No big country trades with the EU only on WTO terms. An acrimonious break-up would make it harder to co-operate in such areas as foreign policy and defence. And it would surely increase the risk of Brexit triggering Scotland’s exit from the United Kingdom.
特雷莎·梅描繪的幻景最危險之處在於她所宣稱的不達成協議好過糟糕協議。不過，她本周提交歐盟的信函倒是稍微跳出了這一觀念。重新採用世界貿易組織規則與歐盟開展貿易將對英國經濟造成嚴重破壞。這意味著英國出口到歐盟的商品中有近一半將被歐盟徵收關稅並設置大量非關稅壁壘。沒有任何大國僅依照世貿組織條款與歐盟進行貿易。硬脫歐會讓英國與歐盟在外交政策和防禦等領域的合作變得更難，也更易誘發蘇格蘭獨立。
Mrs May needs not merely to soften her tone, as she has started to do this week, but to lower expectations. Instead of threatening to undercut her European partners by building an unregulated Singapore-on-Thames (something that, despite its appeal to free-traders, would horrify most Brexit voters), or hinting that Britain might co-operate less fully on security, or claiming that the EU needs Britain more than the other way round, she should accept that in these negotiations she holds the weaker hand. She should hence be more flexible over payments into the EU budget, a subject her letter skates over.
本周特雷莎·梅的言辭已開始有所軟化，但是，她需要的不僅僅是緩和言語，還要降低期許。不要拿英國脫歐後的經濟會和新加坡脫離馬來西亞後的經濟一樣成功的說法（雖然這對自由貿易者很有吸引力，但會給多數脫歐支持者造成恐懼）來威脅削弱歐盟，或者暗示英國將減少與歐盟在安全領域的合作，或宣稱歐盟對英國的依賴要比英國對歐盟的依賴更強，而是應當接受事實，明白在這場談判中是英國處於劣勢。因此，在處理歐盟提出的脫歐費用時她應當更加靈活，而脫歐信函中並未提及此話題。
Because negotiating a full free-trade deal is certain to take more than two years—no country has concluded one with the EU in so short a time—she should accept another consequence: that transitional arrangements will be needed to avoid “falling off a cliff” in March 2019. Her letter talks airily of “implementation periods”, but does not acknowledge how hard these may be to sort out. A proper, time-limited transition might mean prolonging free movement of people and the rule of the ECJ, but that price would be worth paying for a better Brexit.
達成完全自由貿易的協定談判時間肯定會超過兩年，因此，目前尚未出現其他國家在這麼短的時間裡與歐盟達成此項協議，特雷莎·梅應該接受另一後果：需要進行過渡期安排以避免2019年3月英國大選來臨時英國“跌落懸崖”。她在脫歐信函裡提及“實施期”時很是輕鬆，卻並未承認劃分出“實施期”可能會很困難。要想在有限時間裡順利完成過渡，這可能就要延長人員自由流動和歐洲法院的司法管轄權，不過，為了達成更有利的談判結果，這是值得作出的犧牲。
The softer tone of Mrs May’s letter might, with luck, encourage her EU partners to be more accommodating. So far they have reacted to threats from London in kind, talking up the exit bill, insisting that Britain ends up being worse off outside the club than inside and digging in over terms for co-operating in foreign and security policies. There is a possibility of a deal between Britain and the EU that minimizes Brexit’s harm. Unfortunately, in a negotiation against the clock where both sides start so far apart, there is also a big risk of one that maximizes harm instead.
如果幸運的話，特雷莎·梅在信中態度的軟化可能促使歐盟方面採取更為通融的態度。目前為止，面對英國的威脅，歐盟方面從來都是以牙還牙，開出天價脫歐費用，堅稱脫歐後英國經濟將會惡化，堅持外交和安全政策的合作條款。脫歐談判仍有希望將英國損失降到最低。不幸的是，談判日程如此緊張，談判雙方分歧又如此之大，最終的談判結果還有可能讓英國遭受最大的損失。
編譯：覃思曉
審校：郭娜
編輯：翻吧君
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通過這些手段，她告知英國民眾仍然能享受原先的權利。雖然特雷莎·梅承認，對歐盟出口的英國企業未來可能要遵守歐盟法律法規，她越是堅持要管控歐盟移民數量、擺脫歐洲法院管轄，英國在歐盟市場的全面准入障礙就越大。這不僅是因為歐盟開出的條件之一就是確保人員自由流動，也不僅是因為難以確保零關稅商品交易准入——這些問題雙方其實很快就能協商一致。真正原因在於，單一市場為自由貿易清除的最大障礙既非關稅也非海關檢查，而是各類標準、法規和國家支持的法律法規。除非英國全盤接受，而這離不開歐盟體系的裁判，即歐洲法院，否則英國無法享受單一市場的自由貿易，甚至不如那些與歐盟貿易的美國企業。Boxed into a corner
陷入絕境
The most dangerous of Mrs May’s illusions has been her claim that no deal is better than a bad deal. Her letter this week steps back from this notion, but only a pace. To revert to trading with the EU only on World Trade Organization (WTO) terms would cause serious harm to Britain’s economy. It would mean the EU imposing tariffs plus a full panoply of non-tariff barriers on almost half Britain’s exports. No big country trades with the EU only on WTO terms. An acrimonious break-up would make it harder to co-operate in such areas as foreign policy and defence. And it would surely increase the risk of Brexit triggering Scotland’s exit from the United Kingdom.
特雷莎·梅描繪的幻景最危險之處在於她所宣稱的不達成協議好過糟糕協議。不過，她本周提交歐盟的信函倒是稍微跳出了這一觀念。重新採用世界貿易組織規則與歐盟開展貿易將對英國經濟造成嚴重破壞。這意味著英國出口到歐盟的商品中有近一半將被歐盟徵收關稅並設置大量非關稅壁壘。沒有任何大國僅依照世貿組織條款與歐盟進行貿易。硬脫歐會讓英國與歐盟在外交政策和防禦等領域的合作變得更難，也更易誘發蘇格蘭獨立。
Mrs May needs not merely to soften her tone, as she has started to do this week, but to lower expectations. Instead of threatening to undercut her European partners by building an unregulated Singapore-on-Thames (something that, despite its appeal to free-traders, would horrify most Brexit voters), or hinting that Britain might co-operate less fully on security, or claiming that the EU needs Britain more than the other way round, she should accept that in these negotiations she holds the weaker hand. She should hence be more flexible over payments into the EU budget, a subject her letter skates over.
本周特雷莎·梅的言辭已開始有所軟化，但是，她需要的不僅僅是緩和言語，還要降低期許。不要拿英國脫歐後的經濟會和新加坡脫離馬來西亞後的經濟一樣成功的說法（雖然這對自由貿易者很有吸引力，但會給多數脫歐支持者造成恐懼）來威脅削弱歐盟，或者暗示英國將減少與歐盟在安全領域的合作，或宣稱歐盟對英國的依賴要比英國對歐盟的依賴更強，而是應當接受事實，明白在這場談判中是英國處於劣勢。因此，在處理歐盟提出的脫歐費用時她應當更加靈活，而脫歐信函中並未提及此話題。
Because negotiating a full free-trade deal is certain to take more than two years—no country has concluded one with the EU in so short a time—she should accept another consequence: that transitional arrangements will be needed to avoid “falling off a cliff” in March 2019. Her letter talks airily of “implementation periods”, but does not acknowledge how hard these may be to sort out. A proper, time-limited transition might mean prolonging free movement of people and the rule of the ECJ, but that price would be worth paying for a better Brexit.
達成完全自由貿易的協定談判時間肯定會超過兩年，因此，目前尚未出現其他國家在這麼短的時間裡與歐盟達成此項協議，特雷莎·梅應該接受另一後果：需要進行過渡期安排以避免2019年3月英國大選來臨時英國“跌落懸崖”。她在脫歐信函裡提及“實施期”時很是輕鬆，卻並未承認劃分出“實施期”可能會很困難。要想在有限時間裡順利完成過渡，這可能就要延長人員自由流動和歐洲法院的司法管轄權，不過，為了達成更有利的談判結果，這是值得作出的犧牲。
The softer tone of Mrs May’s letter might, with luck, encourage her EU partners to be more accommodating. So far they have reacted to threats from London in kind, talking up the exit bill, insisting that Britain ends up being worse off outside the club than inside and digging in over terms for co-operating in foreign and security policies. There is a possibility of a deal between Britain and the EU that minimizes Brexit’s harm. Unfortunately, in a negotiation against the clock where both sides start so far apart, there is also a big risk of one that maximizes harm instead.
如果幸運的話，特雷莎·梅在信中態度的軟化可能促使歐盟方面採取更為通融的態度。目前為止，面對英國的威脅，歐盟方面從來都是以牙還牙，開出天價脫歐費用，堅稱脫歐後英國經濟將會惡化，堅持外交和安全政策的合作條款。脫歐談判仍有希望將英國損失降到最低。不幸的是，談判日程如此緊張，談判雙方分歧又如此之大，最終的談判結果還有可能讓英國遭受最大的損失。
編譯：覃思曉
審校：郭娜
編輯：翻吧君
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